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Abstract
We analyze the notion that physical theories are quantitative and testable by observations in
experiments. This leads us to propose a new, Bayesian, interpretation of probabilities in physics
that unifies their current use in classical physical theories, experimental physics and quantum
mechanics. Probabilities are the result of quantifying the domain of possibilities that results when
we interpret observations within the framework of a physical theory. They could also be said to be
measures of information used to make predictions based upon a physical theory.
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I. INTRODUCTION
Even though the concept of probabilities has been used in physics for more than 200 years,
Laplace and Gauss having made important contributions, there is no general agreement to-
day concerning their interpretation, even when limited to their use in physics. There is not
even a consensus among physicists as to whether they are ‘logical’ (‘subjective’, Bayesian)
or ‘physical’ (‘objective’, statistical) when they are used in physics. Probabilities do not
enter in all our physical theories. They are absent from classical mechanics, classical elec-
tromagnetic theory and the theories of relativity. However, they play an essential role in our
most successful physical theory: quantum mechanics. Because there is complete agreement
among physicists regarding how probabilities in physical theories should be tested via ob-
servations in experiments, the issue of why and/or how they arise in some physical theories
and not in others is not thought to be fundamental to physics itself.
For some physicists, probabilities in physical theories are ‘physical’ in nature because there
are some physical phenomena that are ‘stochastic’ or ‘random.’ For others, probabilities are
‘physical’ in a ‘statistical’ sense and they arise because of ‘incomplete’ descriptions, as could
be considered the case for classical statistical mechanics. For others still, different physical
mechanisms would be responsible for the probabilities of classical physics and quantum me-
chanics.
On the other side, during the last 50 years the notion that probabilities in physics were of
a Bayesian nature has been getting more and more support. That this was the case for
probabilities in classical physics is likely in large part due to Jeffreys[1]and Jaynes[2]. The
notion that in experimental physics the concepts of Bayesian and statistical probabilities
should be treated not only on an equal footing, but even numerically combined, has now
received the imprimatur of the BIPM[3]. With the development of the field of quantum
computation, during the last 10 years, the notion that the probabilities of quantum me-
chanics could also be Bayesian measures of information has been receiving some support
(Caves et al[4], Mermin[5], Fuchs[6], Peres[7].) In our opinion, an essential obstacle to the
general acceptance by the physics community that probabilities in physics are Bayesian in
nature is the fact that they are said to be: “degrees of belief that an event will occur” as
in the BIPM report[3], “degrees of truth of an assertion conditional upon the truth of some
other assertion(s),” as advocated by Jaynes[2] following Cox[8], or similar concepts that are
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thought by most physicsts to lie outside the realm of physics.
In section II, we show that starting from the notion that classical mechanics is quantitative
and testable by observations in experiments we can generate the algebra of the probabil-
ities used in classical physics. Since there are no probabilities in classical mechanics, we
will obtain probabilities when we deal quantitatively with the ambiguities that must re-
sult when, given some observations in an experiment, we use classical mechanics to make
predictions for future observations that could be considered as tests of classical mechanics.
Consequently, the probabilities so generated will be Bayesian in nature and can be said
to be measures of the information we have when making predictions for the values of the
observable dynamical variables of classical mechanics. In section III, we show how, due to a
very well understood difference between observing classical and quantum systems, classical
mechanics must be modified for quantum systems in order to be quantitative and this leads
to the probability amplitudes and to the principle of superposition of quantum mechanics.
However, the probabilities in quantum mechanics will have precisely the same meaning as
they have in our analysis of observations in experiments using classical mechanics. They will
quantify the ambiguities concerning predictions that we can make for future observations on
quantum systems after we have made on them unambiguous observations. Therefore they
will also be measures of the information we have when making predictions for the values of
the observable dynamical variables of quantum mechanics.
In our approach, probabilities in physics will be thoroughly defined entities in terms of well
understood concepts of classical mechanics and now well established mathematical tools.
What we propose is a simple explanation for why probabilities play a fundamental role in
classical and quantum physics, explanation that we think is missing today. This explanation
is not based upon any new physical mechanism. It is based upon an interpretation of a well
established mathematical technique for dealing with a fundamental problem that experi-
mentalists must face in every experiment. Consequently, it could be said that our argument
is philosophical, rather than physical. While this does not present any problem concerning
classical mechanics, since it is well understood. In the case of quantum mechanics, our
interpretation of how and why its probabilities arise leaves us in the same conundrum as a
plethora of other proposed interpretations that do not affect in any way the current use of
quantum mechanics. However, what sets our argument apart from other interpretations of
the nature and meaning of probabilities in physics, in particular in quantum mechanics, is
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that it rests upon a simple statement that we think is non controversial and should be ac-
ceptable to every physicist: ‘Physical theories are quantitative and testable by observations
in experiments.’
II. CLASSICAL MECHANICS
We understand so well classical mechanics that there seems to be no need to discuss at
length how classical mechanics is a quantitative theory: in its formulas the symbols stand
for real numbers. These formulas will be numerically satisfied when we substitute into them
the numbers that correspond to the values of the measurable dynamical variables in a given
situation. Most frequently these formulas are used to make a quantitative prediction for
an observation corresponding to one of the dynamical variable that was not measured in
an experiment, on the basis of the numerical values of the other dynamical variables that
were measured in that experiment. Quoting from a recent paper[9]: “The description of
the system can be given, in classical mechanics, by a phase-space point. This point is the
‘true’ point — others are false — so the outcome of a measurement can be predicted with
certainty.” We think that the overwhelming majority of physicists, if not all of them, would
agree with this statement. The only trouble is that although we know that this statement is
theoretically correct, for the last two hundred years we have not been able to do in practice,
and will never be able to do, what we state we should theoretically be able to do!
It is frequently stated that in contradistinction with quantum mechanics, classical mechan-
ics is deterministic, i.e. no probabilities enter in its formulas. However, it is a fact that
probabilities have been used for a long time to convey the result of every measurement
of the dynamical variables that enter classical mechanics: position, volume, momentum,
length, etc... For some time now, no refereed physics journal will accept for publication an
experimental paper that will not include a quantified discussion, using probabilities, of the
measurements reported. Until rather recently these probabilities were said in textbooks to
describe the ‘statistical errors’ in the measurements, but that there were also other exper-
imental ‘errors’ that were said to be ‘systematic’ in nature and these were not ‘quantified’
by means of probabilities because there were no ‘statistics’ associated with them. Over
the last thirty years or so, this point of view has gradually changed, one no longer speaks
of experimental ‘errors,’ whether ‘statistical’ or ‘systematic,’ but instead of experimental
4
uncertainties. Most significantly, the BIPM[3] now recommends that all measurement un-
certainties, including those that are not ‘statistical’ in nature, be quantified by means of
probabilities. The probabilities used to quantify the systematic uncertainties are said to
correspond “to a degree of belief that an event will occur.” Although the BIPM report
reviews at length the concept of ‘statistical’ probabilities, only two references to the concept
of ‘Bayesian statistics’ are given and how they should be evaluated in physics experiments
is not discussed. Finally, the BIPM recommends that all the uncertainties, whether ‘statis-
tical’ or ‘systematic’ in nature, be combined into a single probability statement.
‘Statistical’ uncertainties do not arise in many measurements of classical mechanics dy-
namical variables. We therefore postpone discussing them until we have dealt with the
‘systematic’ uncertainties that are impossible to avoid. Another reason we postpone dis-
cussing ‘statistical’ uncertainties in this paper is that the solution we propose for dealing
with the ‘systematic’ uncertainties will give us the tool for dealing with the ‘statistical’
uncertainties. There is at least one reason why ‘systematic’ uncertainties are unavoidable,
they must arise because in order to be quantitative we make measurements and in every
measurement we will specify the outcome with only a finite number of digits. We are not
at all concerned with the notion that some measurements may be accurate enough for some
specific purpose and consequently can be considered exact for that purpose. What we ana-
lyze now is a fundamental problem that results from the fact that in practice we must report
a measurement with a finite number of digits. How this arises can be made concrete via
the example of measuring the length of an object using a set of ‘go, no-go’ gauges. With a
set of ‘go, no-go’ gauges, if one repeats the measurement, one always (i.e. systematically)
gets the same result: the value we seek is smaller than given by the ‘go’ gauge but larger
than given by the ‘no-go’ gauge, whatever are the units used to label the set of gauges used.
Clearly, these two different values are not the length of the object, since it must be a single
real number. These two values are an attribute of the set of ‘go, no-go’ gauges we use to
make the observation that we interpret as providing direct information regarding the length
of the object. If we had used a finer set of ‘go, no-go’ gauges we would likely have obtained
two different values, but we would still have obtained two numbers. In the situation we have
just described, there are no distribution of values that could be dealt with using statistical
concepts.
Many theoretical papers analyzing physical measurements in quantum mechanics view the
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interaction of the observer with the classical measuring instrument as the reading of a
‘pointer on the dial of a gauge’. Due to the finite thickness of the tip of the pointer, and
the finite size of the dial of a gauge, one can only state with certainty that it does not point
below a certain value nor above another value, a result which is conceptually identical to
using a set of ‘go, no-go’ gauges. In our digital age, we could replace the traditional ‘pointer
on the dial of a gauge’ with a ‘digital counter’ that must necessarily have a finite number of
digits. We therefore know that the ‘real number’ we seek is not less than the value shown
on the counter but not more than the value obtained by increasing by 1 the least significant
digit. From a mathematical point of view, as opposed to a practical one, the problem is
the same whether we deal with real numbers that have a single digit or many digits: there
is a continuum of real numbers between them. This source of ‘systematic’ uncertainty is
present in every physics experiment. In many experiments there are other sources of ‘sys-
tematic’ uncertainties, but they are all of the same nature in the sense that they provide
both a lower and an upper bound to the value sought. Of course, all sources of uncertainties
in measurements must be combined to yield an overall uncertainty. In this paper we do
not address this issue. In this section we analyze how one can deal quantitatively with the
problem of ‘systematic’ uncertainties and we further limit ourselves to analyze this problem
in the context of a classical mechanics experiment.
Is one testing classical mechanics when one reports the ‘measurement’ of the length, the
position, the momentum, etc.. of an object to which classical mechanics applies? In a very
real sense yes because what is reported in experimental papers as having been measured in
an experiment, is the result of a process that is often called the data analysis, or data reduc-
tion, where: from the observations made in the experiment, using the relations of classical
mechanics, one makes a deduction concerning the value of the quantity reported as having
been measured. Therefore, in this data analysis one is making a prediction on the basis
of observations made in the experiment and the quantitative relations of classical mechan-
ics in which the reported measured quantity enters and to which the observations apply.
If subsequent observations contradicted the conclusions of the data reduction reported as
the measured quantity one would suspect either that a mistake was made or, very unlikely,
that classical mechanics was falsified in the experiment. Why should probabilities appear
in this process of data analysis since there are no probabilities in the relations used in that
data analysis? It is not because experimentalists are uncertain concerning what they have
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observed in an experiment. Any observation that could be said to be uncertain should be
categorically discarded in drawing predictions based on the relations of classical mechanics.
Fundamentally, the reason why there are uncertainties in the predictions we make on the
basis of observations in experiments is that these predictions are ambiguous. According
to the relations of classical mechanics that relate what was observed and what we seek to
predict: several different predictions, i.e. a range of values, would be consistent with the
observations, but according to classical mechanics that prediction should be a unique real
number. As discussed above, this must necessarily occur if only because we must use a finite
number of digits.
Are the notions of “degrees of belief that an event will occur” or of “degree of truth of an
assertion conditional upon the truth of some other assertion(s)” fully acceptable in physics
in order to assign a probability measure to the possible values? We do not think so be-
cause, in our opinion, the concepts of ‘degrees of belief’ and ‘degree of truth’ do not belong
in physics. In particular if, as we will show, what is accomplished by using them can be
achieved using concepts that have long been considered essential in physics. Since physical
theories are quantitative, when faced with the problem of ‘systematic’ uncertainties, what
we can do as physicists is be quantitative about it and specify the number, or density, of
different possible predictions for the dynamical variable reported as having been measured,
given the unambiguous observations in the experiment and the relations of classical me-
chanics that were used in making these predictions. What we propose is to use a rationale
and a mathematical technique that is fundamentally different from the one used today to
quantify the ‘uncertainties’ in the predictions, i.e. measurements. Most of the time this new
technique, as it should, will yield results, i.e. probabilities, that are close, if not identical,
to those obtained today under a different justification. Therefore, what we propose is a new
logical and mathematical foundation for the probabilities we use in classical physics.
The proposed new technique is based upon a very simple argument: since according to
classical mechanics the ‘value’ (i.e. the real number) of the dynamical variable we seek to
predict, the length, the position, the volume, etc.., is postulated to be unique in the exper-
iment in question, what we can do is formally transform this value, that we do not know
but should be one of the possible values, from the value it has to all the values it has not:
the other possible values. Because these entities in classical mechanics are real numbers the
transformations in question will be additions or multiplications of real numbers and their
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inverse. Since, given what was observed, every possible value could be the value it has in
the experiment, the transformations in question must be applied using every possible value
as the true value. Consequently, each of these transformations has an inverse and one of
them must be an identity transformation. The transformations in question must therefore
form a group. We refer to this group as the possibilities generating transformation group for
what will be reported as the ‘measured’ dynamical variable in the experiment. What this
does is immediately solve our problem of associating a quantitative measure with the set of
possibilities. In the case of classical mechanics, the manifolds of the possibilities generating
transformation groups are Euclidean spaces, because the phase-spaces of classical mechanics
are Euclidean spaces. This is enough to establish that the algebra of a unique measure asso-
ciated with the set of possibilities will have the algebra of probabilities of classical physics.
This unique measure is often called the ‘volume element’ in the group manifold, the ‘Haar’
measure or the ‘weight function’ in group space.
We must emphasize that the probabilities so generated are fully objective in the sense that
any one applying the same formulas of classical mechanics, given precisely what was ob-
served in the experiment must come up with exactly the same probability measure for the
set of possibilities. Such types of probabilities are often said to be ‘subjective’ or Bayesian.
However, these probabilities are not ‘objective,’ in the sense in which this term is used to
specify a concept of probabilities that would be ‘independent of any observer.’ We must
emphasize that the concept of probabilities based upon the possibilities generating trans-
formation groups we propose requires two human interventions: 1 - some observations must
be made by someone, could be made by someone or a situation is postulated to be; 2 -
a physical theory must be chosen to analyze the observations in question to quantify the
number, or density, of possible values. When classical mechanics is the theory used in this
analysis, there are no probabilities in that theory. We could say that the manifold of the
possibilities generating transformation group for the value of a dynamical variable in an
experiment represents our state of knowledge of that dynamical variable in the experiment,
given that classical mechanics is used to analyze what was observed in the experiment. An-
other way to look at the probabilities we have obtained is that it is a measure associated
with the set of possible values that would be obtained if we were to make another, but more
accurate, measurement of that dynamical variable. To use a more modern terminology, we
can say that the probabilities so obtained are a measure of the information we use to make
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a prediction based upon a physical theory and some observations.
The notion that one could use group theory to formally deal with ambiguities is as old as
group theory itself since at the time of his death Evariste Galois[10 ] stated that his main
preocupation for some time had been the application of the theory of ambiguity to tran-
scendental analysis, according to the concluding remark in his celebrated letter addressed
to Auguste Chevalier two days before his death. The idea that Galois’ theory of ambiguity
was group theory and could be used to deal with uncertainties resulting from observations
is not new and was pointed out by George Birkhoff[11 ] more than 60 years ago.
E. T. Jaynes[3] in the last 40 years has been a very eloquent champion of the point of
view that probabilities were not physical, in particular in classical physics, including the
use of transformation group methods. However, we must point out an essential and funda-
mental conceptual difference between what we have stated above and what Jaynes based
his arguments upon. Jaynes defined probabilities as the “degree of truth of an assertion
conditional upon the truth of some other assertion(s)”. Then, to justify his transformation
group method, he introduced a “desideratum of consistency”[12 ]: “In two different problems
where we have the same state of knowledge we should assign the same subjective probabil-
ity.” Our objective is much more limited than the one stated by Jaynes, we stay strictly
within the ambit of physics, doing what physicists have been doing for ages. Probabilities
are not introduced at the outset, they are a consequence of testing the quantitative nature
of our physical theories by observations in experiments. They are the result of enumerating
all the possibilities according to a physical theory used in analyzing the observations made
in an experiment. The transformation groups used are based upon the relations postulated
in a specific physical theory and what is observed in the experiment. The fraction of all the
possibilities that is associated with a subset of possibilities is what we call the probability
associated with that subset of possible values. This is of course conditional upon having
correctly identified what was observed in the physical theory used and that this theory would
not be falsified in that experiment.
So far our argument has been completely abstract, we will now illustrate it with a few
concrete examples. First, we will deal with two problems that have been associated with
concepts of probabilities since antiquity. However, we will analyze them as if they were
classical physics experiments in which some observations are made and classical mechan-
ics is used to quantify the ambiguities of predictions based upon the observations. Next,
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we will consider some whose solutions using probabilities are more recent. Finally, we will
consider a well known 75 years old problem that, to our knowledge, has so far resisted any
satisfactory solution. We have two further purposes in analyzing these classical mechanics
problems. The first one is that although we will be using group theory, it is not because the
problems we deal with have any ‘real’ symmetry associated with them, at best they could
be said to present an ‘apparent’ symmetry, given what was observed and the theory used to
analyze them. The second one is that these examples make very clear that the probabilities
we generate are in no way ‘physical’ and the analysis of what was observed is based upon
the use of a specific physical theory.
A. The Coin
This trivial example involves the information that a coin is at rest lying flat on one side,
which side is facing up is not observed. This information, i.e. the data, could be the result of
observing the coin on edge, or a ‘friend’ is telling us he observed the coin but does not tell us
which way is facing up. We seek to reduce the data we have for which side is facing up. From
classical mechanics, the possibilities generating transformation group for which side is facing
up has two elements: a rotation of the coin of 180 degrees about a horizontal axis changes
which side is facing up and a rotation of 360 degrees about the same axis is the identity
transformation. This transformation group leaves invariant the data: the coin is lying flat
on one side. Since this group is finite the same measure applies to each transformation
and therefore equal probability must be assigned to each possibility. Obviously there is
no symmetry in this situation. The coin need not be in any way symmetrical, nor need
we be told that is was randomly placed, whatever this could mean in a classical mechanics
context. We also did not have to consider “consistent betting behavior”, or any “Dutch-book
argument”, for which side is facing up, as is sometimes done (Caves et al[4]) to justify the
notion of Bayesian probabilities in physics. The instant our ‘friend’, who could be standing
next to us, tells us which side of the coin is actually facing up, our possibilities generating
transformation group, which was different from his, ‘collapses’ to its subgroup: the identity
transformation, a rotation of 360 degrees.
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B. The Playing Die
This second example is a little more interesting and deals with a conventional right handed
playing die. Let us consider that the information, i.e. the data, we have concerning the die
is that it is at rest on an horizontal surface with one of its vertical side facing North. We
reduce this data for the possible orientations of the die. We are dealing again with a well
known problem: the possibilities generating transformation group for the orientation of the
die is the octahedral group (O) with 24 elements. We consequently obtain a probability of
1/24 for each possible orientation of the die. Again, there is no real symmetry involved,
the playing die in question need not be symmetrical nor do we need to be told that it
was randomly tossed. If we wanted to we could reduce the same data only for which side
is facing up, ignoring the value on the side facing North. In this case the possibilities
generating transformation group is the dihedral group (D3) which has 6 elements. Each
of the possibilities is assigned a probability of 1/6. In the conventional fashion we could
call these probabilities ’marginal’ since they ignore which side is facing North. Finally, we
could reduce the data conditional upon a particular value on the side facing say North. The
possibility generating transformation group for the side facing up is the cyclic group of order
4 (C4). Consequently, we have in this case a ‘conditional’ probability of 1/4 for each of the
possibilities for the side facing up. As an important aside, ‘Bayes theorem’ results from
possibilities generating groups that are the direct product of two groups.
C. When and How Fast
We now show, by considering the instant of time and interval of time parameters of
classical mechanics, how results that are often called the ‘Laplace prior’ and the ‘Jeffreys
prior’ can be obtained. Let us say that in an experiment an event is observed to have
occurred not before a time t1 and not after a time t2. Since the event must have occurred
at a specific time t, we have the data: t1 < t < t2. In classical mechanics an instant of time
is a continuous translation invariant parameter, the possibilities generating transformation
group for the time t is the one parameter Lie group T1 where t is transformed into t
′ according
to t′ = t+ α where α is the continuous parameter of the group. The volume measure in the
group manifold of T1 is constant. Therefore, the probability that the event occurred in an
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interval of time dt at any time t between t1 and t2 is dt/(t2 − t1). This result is often called
a Laplace prior: the probability distribution is uniform in an interval.
Next we look at the scale parameter of the time-space of classical mechanics. Let us say
that in this case the period τ of a cyclic phenomenon is observed to be not less than the
time interval τ1 and no greater than the time interval τ2. The data to be reduced is:
τ1 < τ < τ2. Now the possibilities generating transformation group for the period τ is the
scale transformation τ ′ = τ · β where β is the continuous parameter of the group. The
volume measure in the parameter space of this group is no longer constant but proportional
to 1/β. Therefore, the probability that the period of the cyclic phenomenon in question is
in the interval dτ about τ in the range τ1 < τ < τ2 is: dτ/(τln(τ2/τ1)) and zero elsewhere.
This result is often called a Jeffreys prior. In our proposed interpretation of the nature and
meaning of probabilities in physics, the qualifier ‘prior’ to probabilities should never be used
since two things are always required in order to assign probabilities: a physical theory and
some observations.
D. von Mises’ Water and Wine Problem
One of the most interesting application by Jaynes[13] of his group theoretical method
is his proposed solution to the ‘Bertrand Chord Paradox’[14]. Bertrand’s chord paradox is
not a physics experiment but one of plane geometry. Since we know all the ‘quantitative
relations’ between the elements of the geometrical figure involved, the groups of transforma-
tions to generate the possibilities are well defined, as Jaynes shows. Jaynes group theoretical
method to solve ‘ambiguous’ problems has been widely criticized, see van Frassen[15], be-
cause of his inability to solve or explain why he could not solve von Mises’ water and wine
problem. As we will show, we also cannot solve von Mises’s problem as he stated it, but we
can explain why and we can solve it if we consider it a physics measurement problem.
Von Mises[16]’ original statement of his water and wine problem is: “We are given a glass
containing a mixture of water and wine. All that is known about the concentrations of the
liquids is that the ratio of water to wine is not less than 1 and not more than 2; this means
that the mixture contains at least as much water as wine and at most, twice as much water
as wine.” von Mises shows that if one applies Laplace’s prior first to the ratio of water to
wine and then to the ratio of wine to water one gets a contradiction. von Mises water and
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wine problem has long been used as a litmus test for theories of rational decisions in the
face of uncertainty which, to our knowledge, none of them has passed.
Von Mises did not specify what attribute of water and wine was used to express the con-
centrations. If we are going to interpret this problem as one of data reduction in a physics
experiment this must be done. It is only under such conditions that we could apply our
theory of transformations because we need to invoke the relations of the physical theory used
in which the given data enters. We will assume, for simplicity, that in the theory used to
analyze von Mises’ data the volumes are the attributes in question and that in the mixture
they are additive. Let us denote by M the volume of the mixture in the glass, by E the
volume of water in the mixture and by V the volume of wine in the mixture. Therefore, we
consider that the physical theory used to analyze the data states that M = E + V . From
which we obtain: 1 = fe + fv where fe is the fraction of the mixture which is water and fv
the fraction which is wine. The given data is that 1 < (E/V ) < 2 from which we obtain:
1/2 < fe < 2/3 (2.1)
Given that we have: 1 = fe + fv the possibilities generating transformation group for fe,
the fraction of the mixture which is water, is the one parameter Lie group T1 where fe is
transformed into f ′
e
according to f ′
e
= fe + α and α is the continuous parameter of the
group. The volume measure in the group manifold of T1 is constant. Of course, because
the theory we use states that: 1 = fe + fv, to any transformation of fe must correspond a
transformation of fv. Therefore, the probability that the fraction of the mixture which is
water is in the interval dfe about any value of fe in the interval: 1/2 to 2/3 is given by:
6 · dfe. It is equally probable that fe is below or above 7/12.
We must emphasize that we have not ‘solved’ von Mises water and wine problem as he
stated it. We showed how to solve it if it was a physics experiment in which a specific
physical theory ( M = E+V ) was used to analyze the observations. Because wine contains
alcohol, we have used an incorrect ‘physical’ theory to ‘solve’ von Misses problem, we did
so on purpose to point out that the same data analyzed with different theories could yield
different probabilities. We do not know, and in fact as physicist we do not care, if von Mises
water and wine problem can be solved as he stated it. As a referee for Physical Review
we would have requested that von Mises specifies what was ‘measured’ before accepting his
‘experiment’ for publication.
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We could go on and derive some well known results and distributions of classical physics[17].
As is the case for the Maxwellian and the normal distributions, it is a very simple matter
to derive them using possibilities generating transformation groups. As a matter of fact,
Maxwell[18] hinself derived the Maxwellian distribution using an invariance argument. Most
of Jaynes[2] derivations can be readily done using transformation group techniques, since
from the context one can tell which physical ‘theory’ and which ‘observations’ are being
used. At this stage it is important to investigate whether our proposed interpretation of the
nature and meaning of probabilities in physics, which yields mathematical results that have
been used for over a century in classical physics, is a step toward ‘understanding’ quantum
mechanics.
III. NON RELATIVISTIC QUANTUM MECHANICS
The obstacles to understanding quantum mechanics can be appreciated when one real-
izes that it is 75 years old and even though many interpretations of it have been proposed,
a definitive consensus has not yet been reached (Zeilinger[19].) This in spite of the fact
that numerous international conferences have been devoted to the study of its foundation.
Such conferences have been held at least yearly for more than 30 years without any appar-
ent breakthrough. The situation concerning understanding quantum mechanics has barely
changed in the 40 years since Feynman[20], who played a major role in one of its formulations,
made his celebrated statement : “I think I can safely say that nobody today understands
quantum mechanics.” Most, if not all, proposed interpretations of quantum mechanics focus
upon understanding its probabilities. Could our proposed interpretation of the nature and
meaning of probabilities in physics, based only upon the notion that physical theories are
quantitative and testable by observations in experiments, provide a key to ‘understanding’
quantum mechanics? Only time will tell if what we propose is Rabi[21]’s ‘basic point’ : “The
problem is that the theory is too strong, too compelling. I feel we are missing a basic point.
The next generation, as soon as they will have found that point, will knock on their heads
and say: How could they have missed that?”
There are many different formulations of quantum mechanics. We do not think that at this
stage it is essential to proceed via an analysis of an axiomatization of quantum mechanics.
Because we claim to understand classical mechanics and how the fact that it is quantitative
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and testable by observations in experiments leads to the probabilities of classical physics,
we will focus upon a formulation of quantum mechanics that has a very close and direct re-
lationship to classical mechanics. It is one of its earliest formulations: Dirac’s Hamiltonian
formulation of non relativistic quantum mechanics. Quoting Dirac[22] (page 3) “At this
stage it is important to remember that science is concerned only with observable things and
that we can observe an object only by letting it interact with some outside influence. An act
of observation is thus necessarily accompanied by some disturbance of the object observed.
We may define an object to be big when the disturbance accompanying our observation of it
may be neglected, and small when the disturbance cannot be neglected.” Dirac then points
out that one can give an absolute meaning to size, the emphasis is Dirac’s,: “...we have to
assume that there is a limit to the finiteness of our powers of observation and the smallness
of the accompanying disturbance — a limit which is inherent in the nature of things and can
never be surpassed by improved technique or increased skill on the part of the observer. If
the object under observation is such that the unavoidable limiting disturbance is negligible,
then the object is big in the absolute sense and we may apply classical mechanics to it.
If, on the other hand, the limiting disturbance is not negligible, then the object is small
in the absolute sense and we require a new theory for dealing with it.” Systems for which
the ‘limiting disturbance’ is not negligible we will call quantum systems. Those system for
which the ‘limiting disturbance’ is negligible we will call classical systems.
Why can we not use classical mechanics for quantum systems? If classical mechanics was
not modified and taken to apply to a quantum system, the state of the quantum system
would be given by a point in an Euclidean phase space. As explained in section II, even
though we could never experimentally prove it, our measurements should tell us that the
state of the system could be a point within a domain of phase space that becomes smaller
and smaller as we improve the accuracy of the measurements on a particular system. But
because of the well understood manner in which a quantum system is disturbed when we
measure canonically conjugate dynamical variables, the above argument breaks down com-
pletely when applied to quantum systems. The more accurately we measure one of the
observable dynamical variable, the less accurately we can measure the conjugate dynamical
variable. This means that the state of a quantum mechanical system cannot be given by
a point in an Euclidean phase space. The concept of a phase space is based upon the fact
that in the relations of classical mechanics we can take the symbols for conjugate dynamical
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variables to stand for real numbers.
The testability, by observations in experiments, of the quantitative nature of a physical the-
ory rests upon the fact that in order to be measurable the dynamical variables must be real
numbers. This was fully understood by Dirac[22] (page 34) “When we make an observa-
tion we measure some dynamical variable. It is obvious physically that the result of such a
measurement must always be a real number, so we expect that any dynamical variable that
we can measure must be a real dynamical variable.” To solve this problem Dirac invented
his transformation theory of non relativistic quantum mechanics in which the Hamiltonian
formulation of classical mechanics is preserved but the symbols for the measurable dynam-
ical variables are no longer directly real numbers, as they are for classical systems, but
Hermitian operators in an Hilbert space. The eigenvalues of these Hermitian operators are
the real numbers needed to make the theory quantitative and testable by observations in
experiments.
Having obtained real numbers for the measurable dynamical variables of quantum systems,
as eigenvalues of Hermitian operators, these can be measured in experiments. This is done
by having the quantum systems interact with a classical system acting as the measuring
instrument. We will have to face the same problem that we had with measuring dynamical
variables of classical mechanics. That is to say, we will have systematic uncertainties asso-
ciated with their experimental determination and these can be dealt with using possibilities
generating transformation groups to quantify their possible values. An interesting aspect of
the fact that some Hamiltonians will lead to a discrete set of eigenvalues for a dynamical
variable is that one then does not need as high an accuracy in the classical measuring in-
strument to determine which state the quantum system is in, as is the case when we have a
continum of eigenvalues. A consequence of having obtained the real numbers for the mea-
surable dynamical variables of quantum systems via Hermitian operators is that we have
eigenfunctions corresponding to the eigenvalues. These eigenfunctions are rays in an Hilbert
space and strictly speaking there is nothing in classical mechanics that corresponds to them.
We are going to show, with the simplest possible quantum system example, that these eigen-
functions can be interpreted as entities that are completely analogous to the manifolds of
the possibilities generating transformation groups we introduced to deal quantitatively with
ambiguities that occur when we test classical mechanics in experiments.
Let us consider having observed, via a Stern-Gerlach experiment, an electron traveling along
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the y-axis having its spin up in the z-direction. Our observation of its spin up in the z-
direction gives us, in an obvious basis, the eigenfunction:
|Ψ〉 =
(
1
0
)
(3.1)
There is absolutely nothing ambiguous in that eigenfunction concerning what would hap-
pen if we were to repeat that measurement: the spin would be found to be up in the
z-direction. However, what does it tell us about the outcome of a subsequent measurement
of the spin in the xz plane at an angle θ with the positive z-axis?
The operator Ŝθ corresponding to that measurement can be expressed in terms of the pro-
jection of the x and z operators:
Ŝθ = sin(θ)Ŝx + cos(θ)Ŝz =
h¯
2
(
cos(θ) sin(θ)
sin(θ) − cos(θ)
)
(3.2)
The eigenvalues of Ŝθ are h¯/2 and −h¯/2 and the corresponding eigenvectors are:
(
cos(θ/2)
sin(θ/2)
)
and
(
−sin(θ/2)
cos(θ/2)
)
(3.3)
We can therefore write the eigenfunction corresponding to our observation of the spin up
in the z-direction as:
(
1
0
)
= cos(θ/2)
(
cos(θ/2)
sin(θ/2)
)
− sin(θ/2)
(
−sin(θ/2)
cos(θ/2)
)
(3.4)
What this results precisely means has been known for over 70 years. There are two
possibilities: the spin could be found to be up or down and we have an ‘amplitude’ associated
with each possibility. This is the simplest example of the ‘superposition principle’. Because,
the eigenfunction is a ray in an Hilbert space, the ‘amplitude’ associated with each possibility
is a complex number. In order to obtain a ‘real’ measure associated with each possibility
we must use the ‘norm’ of these amplitudes. These norms are what we call the probabilities
for the various possibilities.
Let us suppose we do perform the measurement of the spin observable at that angle θ The
instant we observe which of the two possible eigenvalues prevails in this measurement, our
state of knowlege concerning the value of the spin observable along that angle θ changes from
ambiguous to certain. The eigenfunction which expressed the ambiguity concerning which
eigenvalue would be observed collapses to the eigenfunction corresponding to the eigenvalue
17
that was observed. This new eigenfunction can be used to make quantitative predictions for
the spin values that could be observed in subsequent experiments.
When we deal with classical systems the ambiguities concerning what could be observed
in future experiments, given what was observed on this classical system, are expressed
quantitatively via the Euclidean manifold of a possibilities generating transformation group.
When we deal with a quantum system the same problem arrises but now the quantification
of the ambiguities concerning what could be observed in the future is given by the ray in
Hilbert space which is the eigenfunction corresponding to the eigenvalue of the dynamical
variable that was observed. Such observations upon which we base predictions for future
observations are often said today to prepare a quantum system in a given state. Consequently
the ‘algebra’ of the probabilities for quantum systems is different from the ‘algebra’ of the
probabilities for classical systems. This provides a complete explanation of Bell’s inequalities
which are applicable only to classical systems, and are indeed not applicable to quantum
systems. From a logical point of view an even more fundamental difference between classical
and quantum systems is their respective ‘principles of superposition’. In classical systems
this principle refers to physical states of the systems. In quantum mechanics it refers to
a state of ambiguity we have concerning predictions for future observations, when we have
made some observations on , i.e. prepared, a quantum system.
IV. CONCLUSION
We have shown that based upon the requirement that physical theories be quantitative
and testable via observations in experiments, we can interpret probabilities in both classical
and quantum physics as being ‘logical’ rather than ‘physical’. Their Bayesian nature does
not depend upon the introduction of concepts such as ‘degrees of belief’ or ‘degrees of truth
of assertions,’ often associated today with the concept of Bayesian probabilities, even in
physics. They are the result of quantifying the domain of possibilities that results when we
interpret observations within the framework of a physical theory. Probabilities in physics
could also be said to be measures of information interpreted within the framework of a
physical theory.
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